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Abstract 
 
 On June 9, 2013, the world was introduced to Edward Joseph Snowden, a 29-year-old 
NSA contractor and the man responsible for the biggest leak of classified government documents 
in American history. Almost immediately, comparisons were drawn between Snowden and 
another famous whistleblower—Daniel Ellsberg, the man behind the 1971 release of the 
Pentagon Papers. The overwhelming rhetoric surrounding the comparison was that Ellsberg was 
a true American patriot and that Snowden was nothing like him, that he was a traitor. Despite 
Ellsberg’s own claims that he and Snowden are exactly alike, the media still finds Snowden 
lacking when comparing him with Ellsberg. This research examined a sample of new 
organizations’ portrayals of Ellsberg and Snowden during their respective whistleblowing 
scandals to determine what similarities and differences exist in the coverage.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 Consider, for a moment, a warm June day. America is at war. Protest is rampant. While 
the sun is coming up and businesses are opening their doors, millions of Americans are getting 
the news of the day in the morning headlines. Most days are indistinguishable from those that 
precede it; the news is filled with mundane reports of financial markets, political gridlock, or 
feature fluff. This, however, is not one of those days. This day is completely remarkable.  
 What is even more remarkable is this description could fit not one but two landmark 
news days in American history—days separated by nearly 42 years. The first was June 13, 1971, 
when The New York Times published the Pentagon Papers; the second was June 6, 2013, when 
The Guardian began publishing a series of articles by journalist Glenn Greenwald, detailing 
ongoing abuses by the National Security Agency (NSA). Both events sparked widespread debate, 
political scandal, and close examinations of the men who leaked the information that was 
published: Daniel Ellsberg and Edward Snowden, respectively. 
 It is widely held the Pentagon Papers, leaked by Ellsberg, shaved years off the Vietnam 
War and led to greater scrutiny of government officials. History has vindicated Daniel Ellsberg. 
America is still, however, in the throes of the Snowden scandal, the former NSA analyst viewed 
by some as a hero and others as Public Enemy Number One.   
Description of the Study 
This thesis will examine the media’s portrayals of Ellsberg and of Snowden during the 
year immediately following the publication of information they supplied to journalists. Because 
the scope of media has grown immensely over the 42-year span between the two leaks, this 
research will be limited to newspaper coverage for an apples-to-apples comparison. Primarily, 
articles from The Washington Post will be used.  
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The following questions will guide this research: 
1) What language is used to describe the whistleblower in coverage of the 
leak? 
2) Does the article or journalist seem to be passing judgment on the 
individual being reported? 
I will attempt to determine if Ellsberg’s status as a hero and patriot was evident from the 
time he leaked the Pentagon Papers or if he was vilified in the media. If it is the latter, one may 
assume Snowden will enjoy, in time, the same exoneration.  
Limitations of the Study 
 This study is limited to the media’s portrayals of Daniel Ellsberg and Edward Snowden. 
It does not attempt to determine the public’s reactions to those portrayals or whether the media 
outlets were successful in influencing public opinion.  
 This study is limited to newspaper portrayals of each whistleblower in the year following 
his respective scandal. It does not attempt to analyze portrayals by television or radio media 
outlets.  
Definitions of Key Terms 
 The following operational definitions will be used in the course of this research: 
• Whistleblower: one who speaks out against injustice in the name of the public good 
(Alford, 2001, p. 18). Whistleblowing “reveals government fraud and abuse and tends to 
strengthen the public’s faith in government” (Norris, 2013, p. 695). 
• Leaker: one who discloses classified information without permission. Leaks “actually 
harm the nation’s defense capabilities or assist its enemies” (Norris, 2013, p. 695). 
3 
 
• Pentagon Papers: A 7,000-page study of the United States’ involvement in the Vietnam 
War and in Asia from 1945 and 1967, classified as top secret. Ellsberg made copies of the 
document and gave them to The New York Times and The Washington Post in 1971 
(Ellsberg, 2002). 
• NSA: Acronym for the National Security Agency of the United States. 
• Espionage Act of 1917: A federal law established during World War I to “punish acts of 
interference with the foreign relations, and the foreign commerce of the United States, to 
punish espionage, and better enforce the criminal laws of the United States” (U.S. Code 
18, Part 1, Chapter 37).  
• The Fourth Amendment: An amendment to the United States Constitution intended to 
ensure the reasonable expectation of privacy of all American citizens. It states: “The right 
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to searched, and the persons or things to be seized” (U.S. Const. amend. IV). 
• Prior restraint: The restriction of the right of the press to publish what it chooses. The 
First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects the press from prior restraint 
(Blanchard, 2013, p. 23). 
• Communication Content: Referred to simply as “content,” this refers to “actually 
listening in on people’s phone calls or reading their emails or online chats, as well as 
reviewing Internet activity” (Greenwald, 2014, p. 132).  
• Communication Metadata: In relation to communication content, metadata collection 
“involves amassing data about those communications,” such as the time, length, and 
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location of a call; the number of emails sent and to whom; and the types of devises used 
for communicating.   
Conclusion 
 When Edward Snowden revealed himself as the whistleblower responsible for the leak of 
thousands of NSA documents that detailed what he believed to be systematic abuses and 
intrusions into the privacy of the American public, the comparisons to Daniel Ellsberg began 
almost immediately. To some (including Ellsberg himself), Snowden was the next Ellsberg—a 
great American hero standing up to government overreach. To others, Snowden was the opposite 
of Ellsberg—a coward who threatened American lives and the foundations of democracy while 
refusing to face the consequences of what he had done. How does the public come to one 
conclusion or the other? What shapes or influences such judgments? The media are certainly 
complicit, whether in small or large part, in public perception of a scandal. When used 
effectively, the media can rain applause or scorn down upon any subject.  
This research will attempt to determine whether the media portrayed Daniel Ellsberg and 
Edward Snowden similarly during their respective scandals. Chapter 2 will provide a review of 
literature relevant to this topic. Chapter 3 will present the methods used in this research, while 
Chapter 4 will discuss the answers gleaned using those methods. Chapter 5 will offer a 
conclusion and suggestions for further research. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
 The current study aims to examine the similarities and differences between the media’s 
portrayals of the respective whistleblowing scandals of Daniel Ellsberg in 1971 and Edward 
Snowden in 2013. This literature review is organized into three primary components: research on 
the Espionage Act of 1917 and its use to prosecute whistleblowers; research on Daniel Ellsberg 
and the release of the Pentagon Papers; and research on Edward Snowden and the release of 
thousands of classified NSA documents.  
The Espionage Act of 1917 
 The Espionage Act was enacted under the presidency of Woodrow Wilson on June 15, 
1917, just two months after the United States entered World War I. It is a criminal justice statute 
“historically ‘reserved for the treasonous act of giving secret information to the enemy’” (Norris, 
2013, p. 694). It addressed the issues of “the disclosure of classified information; gathering or 
delivering defense information to aid foreign governments; gathering, transmitting, or losing 
defense information; harboring or concealing persons; the use of aircraft for photographing 
defense installations; and the publication and sale of photographs of defense installations” 
(Espionage Act of 1917). Daniel Ellsberg was charged under the Espionage Act in 1971 for 
releasing the top secret Pentagon Papers to The New York Times; Ellsberg was freed of those 
charges due to a mistrial (Rudenstine, 1996). Edward Snowden has been charged with violating 
the Espionage Act for releasing classified NSA documents to reporters from The Guardian and 
The Washington Post (Greenwald, 2014). At the time of this study, his case is on-going, as 
Snowden has received temporary asylum in Russia.  
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 In the nearly 100 years since its inception, the Espionage Act has been used relatively 
sparingly to prosecute whistleblowers. As Norris (2013) noted, this has had potentially negative 
implications for those whistleblowers who faced charges under the Espionage Act: “Because 
previous administrations rarely used the Espionage Act to prosecute individuals who leaked 
classified information to the media, the statute has faced only sparing judicial review and allows 
for strict prosecution of seemingly legitimate whistleblowers” (p. 695).  Norris differentiated 
between “seemingly legitimate whistleblowers” and their opposite as “good whistleblowers” and 
“bad leakers.” According to Norris, “Bad leaks actually harm the nation’s defense capabilities or 
assist its enemies, while good whistleblowing reveals government fraud and abuse and tends to 
strengthen the public’s faith in government” (p. 695). 
 As Greenwald (2014) noted, it is easy for the government to claim that any 
whistleblowing has harmed the nation’s security. It is equally easy for the government to claim 
the types of surveillance Snowden revealed were necessary. According to Greenwald,  
A prime justification for surveillance—that it’s for the benefit of the population—
relies on projecting a view of the world that divides citizens into categories of good 
people and bad people. In that view, the authorities use their surveillance powers only 
against the bad people, those who are ‘doing something wrong,’ and only they have 
anything to fear from the invasion of their privacy…For many, the argument works. 
The perception that invasive surveillance is confined only to a marginalized and 
deserving group of those ‘doing wrong’—the bad people—ensures that the majority 
acquiesces to the abuse of power or even cheers it on. (p. 182) 
 
The specter of terrorism in a post-September 11 world has led to heightened rhetoric about 
national security. What began with the George W. Bush administration only expanded in the 
Barack Obama administration.  
The Espionage Act and the Obama administration. According to Norris (2013), “the 
Obama administration has taken a severe stance toward leakers when the disclosed information 
involves national defense” (p. 695). “Under the Obama administration,” noted Norris, “seven 
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other individuals [in addition to Chelsea Manning] have been similarly charged, more than all 
previous administrations combined” (p. 694). Private First Class Chelsea Manning (formerly 
known as Bradley Manning) was charged under and found guilty of violating the Espionage Act 
for providing classified materials to the website WikiLeaks. In August of 2013, she was 
sentenced to 35 years in prison. According to Norris (2013), “due to its active pursuit under 
whistleblowers, especially under the Espionage Act, the Obama administration has gained a 
reputation for severity that contradicts the President’s campaign-trail dicta.” As a presidential 
candidate, Obama was “a champion of whistleblower rights,” but he “departed markedly from 
this reputation with his position on national security leaks” (698-699).  
Daniel Ellsberg and the Pentagon Papers 
 Before he gained notoriety as the man responsible for the leak of the Pentagon Papers, 
Daniel Ellsberg was a well-respected “former Pentagon and State Department analyst who had 
spent two years in Vietnam and had advised Former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and 
National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger” (Kitrosser, 2011, p. 90). His status gave him access 
to highly classified government documents, among them a Vietnam War study now known as the 
Pentagon Papers. As noted by Weiskopf and Willimot (2013):  
The Papers—official titled ‘United States—Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967: A Study 
Prepared by the Department of Defense’—comprised a 47-volume politico-military 
history of the U.S.-Vietnam relationship from 1945 to 1967. It was prepared within 
and by the U.S. Department of Defense under the instruction of Robert McNamara, 
the Secretary for Defense, for reasons that remain obscure. The Papers were top 
secret, and were accessible to only a tiny elite of officials and advisers within the 
Pentagon, who included Ellsberg (the President had no knowledge of them). Their 
contents revealed how successive administrations—from Truman to Johnson—had 
grossly and repeatedly misled both the public and Congress about actions of the U.S. 
in Vietnam. (p. 476) 
 
In the spring of 1971, Ellsberg smuggled the Papers out of his office and made copies of them to 
distribute to The New York Times. This was not Ellsberg’s preferred way of confronting the 
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injustices he found in the Pentagon Papers. He had spent months taking the Papers and his 
concerns to various officials in the government—to no avail. If he had any hope of affecting 
change in the war, he had to take the Papers public. Ellsberg worked with reporter Neil Sheehan, 
and The New York Times began publishing the Papers on June 13, 1971 (Rudenstine, 1996).  
The Pentagon Papers had dramatic effects on the political scene in the 1970s. According 
to Weiskopf and Willimot (2013), “Ellsberg’s leak of the Papers contributed to the termination 
of the Vietnam War, the end of Nixon’s presidency, and the growth of a healthier skepticism 
with regard to claims made by U.S. administrators” (p. 476). Kitrosser (2011) concurred: 
The Papers’ revelations impacted Americans’ willingness to take on faith the honesty 
and competence of their government…Closely related to wariness toward 
government claims of expertise based on secret knowledge is another type of 
skepticism fostered by the Papers’ leak: Skepticism toward government claims that 
information must be kept secret in the name of national security in the first place. (p. 
91) 
 
 The government’s response was swift, and Ellsberg became the first American to be 
charged under the Espionage Act of 1917 “for giving information to the American public” 
(Ellsberg, 2014, para. 7). Kitrosser (2011) adeptly summarized the 23 months Ellsberg was under 
indictment:  
Ellsberg has said that he believed he was likely to be incarcerated for the rest of his 
life for leaking the Papers. He was indicted and tried, although the case was 
eventually dismissed due to a string of government misconduct. The government had 
suppressed evidence, burglarized the office of Ellsberg’s psychiatrist, illegally 
wiretapped Ellsberg’s conversations, and held secret discussions with the judge trying 
Ellsberg’s case about the judge’s possible appointment as FBI Director. (p. 89-90) 
 
Ellsberg had a happy ending, and history has shined a heroic light upon his actions. As 
Kitrosser (2011) noted: 
The Pentagon Papers leak and its aftermath marked an important moment of social 
learning. To this day, they are invoked as evidence that leaking classified information 
is not always dangerous, that some leaks serve the public interest, and that 
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government can just as easily use secrecy to shield wrongdoing as to protect national 
security. (p. 119) 
 
In the 40 years since his indictment, Ellsberg has repeatedly called for reform to the Espionage 
Act, noting “in recent years, the silencing effect of the Espionage Act has only become 
worse…The current state of whistleblowing prosecutions under the Espionage Act makes a truly 
fair trial wholly unavailable to an American who has exposed classified wrongdoing” (Ellsberg, 
2014, para. 6, 11).  
Edward Snowden and the NSA 
 Edward Snowden went from an unknown NSA contractor to a household name and 
infamous fugitive in a matter of days. It all started on June 5, 2013, with a story in The Guardian 
by reporter and Pulitzer-winning journalist Glenn Greenwald: “NSA collecting phone records of 
millions of Verizon customers daily” (Gurnow, 2014, p. 43-44). It was merely the tip of the ice 
berg, as “the White House, intelligence community, Capitol Hill, multinational corporations, 
civil liberties groups, China, and the American population were about to be treated to a five-day 
production” of breaking stories and scandal (Gurnow, 2014, p. 43). Those stories would detail 
massive and far-reaching surveillance programs established by the U.S. government. On June 9, 
2013, the source of that information was named in a 12-minute video posted on The Guardian’s 
website. Edward Joseph Snowden, 29 years old, was the man behind what was quickly noted in 
The New York Times as “the most significant security breach in American history” (as cited in 
Gurnow, 2014, p. vii). 
 Snowden had collected thousands of NSA documents during his years working as a 
contractor with the NSA. Those documents detailed how  
between them (and in close collaboration) the NSA and [British intelligence agency 
Government Communications Headquarters] now have access not just to ‘metadata’ 
(who and when) but to the content of a huge proportion of the phone calls, Internet 
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searches, and online transactions made by ordinary citizens, in their own and in other 
countries. This ‘suspicionless surveillance’ occurs without specific authorization by 
any judicial or political authority, using technologies which break encryption codes, 
subvert security systems and tap fiber optic cables, and laws which force telephone 
and Internet companies to hand over their customers’ apparently private data. 
(Making Sense of Snowden, 2013, p. 433) 
 
According to Snowden, the NSA had access to, had gathered, and was hoarding multitudes of 
data and telephony metadata of the communications of millions of American citizens and 
internationals, all without warrant or suspicion of wrongdoing (Greenwald, 2014; Gurnow, 
2014).  
 The growing ubiquity of the Internet and mobile telephones made the collection of such 
data possible for the NSA and agencies like it. According to Landau (2013), the statutes and laws 
in place to protect citizens’ privacy, like the Electronic Communications Act of 1986, had not 
“kept pace with technology. People carry their mobile devices all day long, and the result is that 
cell phones disclose far more personal information than stationary ones did in 1986” (p. 67). The 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act was passed  
to govern the real-time capture of calling data—so-called pen register and trap and 
trace—as well as the collection of call data records (CDRs) and store content such as 
email. At the time of the ECPA’s passage, telephones were essentially stationary, and 
such metadata wasn’t deemed worthy of much legal protection….Consequently, 
metadata can be obtained by the government on the basis that it’s relevant to an 
ongoing investigation; there’s no requirement of probable cause. (p. 67-68) 
 
Landau noted that “although the law provides less protection for metadata than content, metadata 
can be even more revelatory than content itself—for example, it can reveal who attended church 
versus an Alcoholic Anonymous meeting” (p. 69). 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 only exacerbated the government’s seeming 
perception it needed to monitor the communications of any number of individuals in the name of 
national security. According to Landau (2013), after the attacks, “the criteria to conduct 
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surveillance, whether electronic or otherwise, loosened” (p. 68). The Bush administration argued 
that such surveillance was necessary to curtail terrorism and protect the lives of American 
citizens.  
To Snowden, this kind of pervasive surveillance of the unknowing American public was 
a great abuse of power. According to Greenwald (2014), Snowden felt so strongly this was an 
abuse that he abandoned his well-paying government job, long-term girlfriend, and life of 
comfort in Hawaii to expose the truth. Snowden “was determined to expose the extremity of 
NSA spying revealed by the documents, so as to enable an enduring public debate with real 
consequences, rather than achieve a one-off scoop that would accomplish nothing beyond 
accolades for the reporters” (Greenwald, 2014, p. 56).  
Snowden was calculated in his attempt to expose this perceived wrongdoing. He spent 
months, using his access as an NSA contractor, collecting and organizing the documents he 
needed to convey the severity of the issue, as he saw it. When he first began combing through the 
cache of leaked documents, Greenwald (2014) noted the following: 
As I continued reading, two things struck me about the archive. The first was how 
extraordinarily well organized it was. The source [Snowden] had created countless 
folders and then sub-folders and then sub-sub-folders. Every last document had been 
placed exactly where it belonged. I never found a misplaced or misfiled 
document…The other striking facet of the archive was the extent of government lying 
it revealed. (p. 29-30) 
 
Snowden was nothing if not thoughtful and thorough as he ventured into the territory of 
whistleblowing.  
Snowden relied on the judgment of the journalists he contacted—Glenn Greenwald and 
Laura Poitras—to decide what to release or withhold in regard to the information he provided. 
Greenwald (2014) recalled: 
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[Snowden told us], ‘I’m relying on you to use your journalistic judgment to only 
publish those documents that the public should see and that can be revealed without 
harm to innocent people.’ If for no other reason, Snowden knew that our ability to 
generate a real public debate depended on not allowing the U.S. government any 
valid claims that we had endangered lives through publishing the documents. (p. 53) 
 
According to Greenwald (2014), Snowden wanted to work with reporters who could interpret, 
analyze, and synthesize the massive amounts of content he provided so the public could consume 
the revelations, properly absorb the intended impact, and take action. 
Snowden was also thoughtful about the likely consequences of his actions. When asked 
about the potential of prosecution and jail time, he told Greenwald (2014), “I’m going to try not 
to. But if that’s the outcome from all of this, and I know there’s a huge chance that it will be, I 
decided a while ago that I can live with whatever they do to me. The only thing I can’t live with 
is knowing I did nothing” (p. 51).  Snowden told The Guardian, “This country is worth dying 
for” (as cited in Ellsberg, 2013, para. 11). 
Snowden’s desire to avoid jail became a hot-button issue among those who disagreed 
with his actions. Secretary of State John Kerry called Snowden a “coward” and a “traitor” and 
told television reporters Snowden “should man up and come back to the United States” to face 
the consequences of his leaks (as cited in Ellsberg, 2014, para. 3). Many comparisons were made 
between Snowden and Daniel Ellsberg, who stood trial and faced charges under the Espionage 
Act in the 1970s. Ellsberg was used by many as the standard by which all whistleblowers should 
be held; in fact, Kerry claimed “there are many a patriot—you can go back to the Pentagon 
Papers with Dan Ellsberg and others who stood and went to the court system of America and 
made their case” (as cited in Ellsberg, 2014, para. 2).  
In response to these comparisons, Ellsberg wrote a number of op-eds in support of 
Snowden’s action. According to Ellsberg (2014), “Edward Snowden is the greatest patriot of our 
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time, and he knows what I learned more than four decades ago: until the Espionage Act gets 
reformed he can never come home safe and receive justice” (para. 1). He noted that “many 
people compare Edward Snowden to me unfavorably for leaving the country and seeking 
asylum, rather than facing trial as I did. I don’t agree. The country I stayed in was a different 
America, a long time ago” (Ellsberg, 2013, para. 1). Ellsberg (2014) offered a grim prediction for 
the treatment Snowden would receive as he awaited trial: 
Snowden would come back home to a jail cell—and not just an ordinary cell-block 
but isolation in solitary confinement, not just for months like Chelsea Manning but 
for the rest of his sentence, and probably the rest of his life….As I know from my 
own case, even Snowden’s own testimony on the stand would be gagged by 
government objections and the (arguably unconstitutional) nature of his charges. That 
was my own experience in court, as the first American to be prosecuted under the 
Espionage Act—or any other statute—for giving information to the American people. 
(para. 5-7)  
 
Unlike in the scenario he predicts for Snowden, Ellsberg was allowed out on bond during the 
extent of his trial. He was allowed to continue his work with the movement he supported by 
whistleblowing. As he noted, “for the whole two years I was under indictment, I was free to 
speak to the media and at rallies and public lectures” (Ellsberg, 2013, para. 3). The treatment of 
every whistleblower since Ellsberg has indicated Snowden would receive no such allowances. 
Smith (2014) supported this assertion, stating, “under the Espionage Act, there is no 
whistleblower loophole that would allow Snowden to argue that he should be forgiven for 
exposing government wrongdoing” (p. 11). 
The response. The government’s response to Snowden’s action was rapid and sharp. 
According to Landau (2013), “NSA Director General Keith Alexander said that Snowden had 
caused ‘irreversible damage’ to the U.S., while Senate Intelligence Committee Chair Dianne 
Feinstein said Snowden’s action was treasonous” (p. 66). However, as Norris (2013) noted:  
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Opinions on Snowden’s conduct are far from unanimous. While some would cite the 
government surveillance programs as prime examples of secret, illegal, and unethical 
government misconduct ripe for whistleblowing, others find the leak treasonous. 
Human Rights Watch ‘urge[d] the Obama administration not to prosecute Edward 
Snowden…until it is prepared to explain to the public, in as much detail as possible, 
what…concrete and specific harms to national security his disclosures have caused, 
and why they outweigh the public’s right to know.’ Former President Jimmy Carter 
supports Snowden’s revelations because, due to lack of transparency, ‘America does 
not have a functioning democracy at this point in time.’ Other high-ranking 
politicians, however, have accused Snowden of treason and Senator Lindsey Graham 
even said that he should be ‘tracked to the ends of the earth.’ Given its divisive 
nature, it’s not surprising that courts also struggle with the issue. (p. 698) 
 
Senator Rand Paul, a Republican from Kentucky, stated, “I think, really, in the end, history’s 
going to judge that he revealed great abuses of our government and great abuses of our 
intelligence community” (as cited in Smith, 2014, p. 11). His Republican colleague, 
Representative Mike Rogers from Michigan, however, claimed “Snowden’s actions are likely to 
have lethal consequences for our troops in the field” (as cited in Smith, 2014, p. 11). The divide 
among Snowden’s supporters and dissenters did not fall along party lines. 
 David V. Gioe (2014), a former CIA operations officer, argued Snowden’s leaks did far-
reaching and long-lasting harm to America’s intelligence gathering infrastructure. According to 
Gioe, “perception is the reality that matters in the world of intelligence” (p. 55). Gioe claimed 
Snowden’s leaks jeopardized America’s ability to gather foreign intelligence, as U.S. intelligence 
operatives may have difficulty convincing sources to trust that America is able to protect them. 
“In all cases,” Gioe noted, “potential sources must be reassured that hushed words stated in 
confidence won’t endanger them in the next tranche of leaked information” (p. 53). Gioe offered 
the following prediction for the state of American intelligence gathering after the Snowden 
scandal: 
The future damage of the Manning and Snowden disclosures will wane over time, but 
this does not make them any less dangerous, especially now. In the short term, 
America has lost valuable diplomatic leverage as well as counterterrorist capabilities. 
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In the medium term, America will have lost [human intelligence] from potential 
future sources as well as [signals intelligence] from liaison partners that could provide 
an intelligence advantage over rival states, avert strategic surprise, and identify 
terrorists or proliferators of weapons of mass destruction. Only in the long term, once 
America has proven to both its allies and its adversaries that it can keep its secrets, 
will the country be able to benefit from [intelligence] sources that will not be obtained 
in the short and medium term thanks to Manning and Snowden. This damage could 
take a generation to repair. (p. 59) 
 
As previously noted, at the time of this research, Snowden was living in Russia with temporary 
asylum; his scandal is on-going and without conclusion.  
Conclusion 
This literature review explored the existing research on the Espionage Act of 1917 and 
the respective whistleblowing scandals of Daniel Ellsberg and Edward Snowden. According to 
McGovern and Roche (1972): 
The publication of ‘confidential’ materials has inevitably given rise to a debate 
concerning a number of different but related problems: To what extent do the 
revelations contained in the documents throw light on events or policy decisions with 
which they deal? To what extent, if at all, does the publication of the information 
contained in the documents jeopardize the processes of executive decision-making? 
How can the conflict between the public’s right to know and the executive’s need for 
confidentiality be reconciled? (p. 173) 
 
The next chapter details the research methods used in this study. 
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Chapter 3: Research Methods 
Introduction 
 This chapter is organized around the methods that guided this research. The purpose of 
this study was to determine the differences and similarities between the media’s portrayals of 
Daniel Ellsberg and Edward Snowden during their respective whistleblowing scandals. I did a 
content analysis, but I did not use traditional content analysis methods. Rather, I performed a 
thematic analysis on the texts that comprised my sample of media from news organizations to 
answer the research questions that guided this study. This chapter will provide a description of 
thematic analysis and will present the research questions explored in this study, as well as the 
sampling and research methods and the processes of data collection and interpretation used.  
Thematic Analysis 
 This research employed thematic analysis as a tool for exploring the research questions 
and collecting data. According to Joffe and Yardley (2004), “Content analysis is the accepted 
method of investigating texts, particularly in mass communications research. Most content 
analysis results in a numerical description of features of a given text….Thematic analysis is 
similar to content analysis, but pays greater attention to the qualitative aspects of the material 
analyzed” (p. 56). Thematic analysis requires the researcher to establish categories, or themes, 
based upon the recurrent data and patterns found in the sample.  
Research Questions 
The research questions being explored by this study are: 
1) What language is used to describe the whistleblower in coverage of the 
leak? 
17 
 
2) Does the article or journalist seem to be passing judgment on the 
individual being reported? 
Sample  
For this research, the sample consisted of newspaper articles published in the year 
following the release of documents by each of the subjects named in this study: Daniel Ellsberg 
and Edward Snowden. Many of the articles selected came from The Washington Post.  
Research Design  
I used thematic analysis to gather qualitative data on the media’s portrayal of Daniel 
Ellsberg and Edward Snowden during their respective whistleblowing scandals. The following 
steps were followed: 
1) I gathered samples for analysis. To do this, I pulled articles from online 
databases and archives that pertained to the topic and were published 
during the established time parameters of the study. Articles published 
during the 1970s Pentagon Papers scandal were purchased from The 
Washington Post archives. 
2) I read each article for an initial introduction to its content without 
taking notes. Once I had done this for every article, I read each one for 
a second and third time, making notes on the articles themselves and in 
a notebook. 
3) I examined my notes for common words, phrases, and tones that were 
prevalent across the sample for each whistleblower.  
4) I categorized the commonalities I determined into themes. 
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5) I analyzed those themes to answer the research questions and reach a 
conclusion. 
Data Collection 
The data were collected through thematic analysis and used to determine the existence of 
concepts or themes that would portray each whistleblower in a particular light.  
Interpretation 
 Once I had established the themes into which the data could fall, I interpreted the data 
using the paradigmatic conceptual device. According to Lindlof and Taylor (2011), the 
paradigmatic approach offers “a set of contrasting elements of a cultural domain” (p. 268). For 
this research, the two contrasting paradigms were “respected” versus “reviled.”  
Summary 
 This chapter outlined the methods that were used to conduct research on the topic of 
portrayals of Daniel Ellsberg and Edward Snowden in the media during their respective 
whistleblowing scandals. Thematic analysis was used to examine the texts gathered for 
interpretation. That analysis provided the results that will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
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Chapter 4: Results 
Introduction 
 The purpose of this research was to determine the similarities and differences between 
the media’s portrayals of Daniel Ellsberg and of Edward Snowden during their respective 
whistleblowing scandals. This chapter presents an analysis of the results of the thematic analysis 
performed in this study.  
 The sample for this study was newspaper articles published in the year following the 
leaks of classified government documents by Ellsberg and by Snowden. Data were collected 
through thematic analysis of those articles; themes and concepts were coded for existence. The 
following research questions were examined: 
1) What language is used to describe the whistleblower in coverage of the 
leak? 
2) Does the article or journalist seem to be passing judgment on the 
individual being reported? 
Audience 
 The intended audience of this research study is journalists, journalism scholars, 
communication scholars, and other media professionals. Such professionals may draw 
conclusions from this research that could impact the use of the media to shape public opinion. 
This study also has implications for government officials who participate in the classification of 
information the American public should know. 
Newspaper Articles 
 Newspapers articles were used to collect data for this research study of the media’s 
portrayals of two government whistleblowers. The articles pertaining to Ellsberg’s release of the 
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Pentagon Papers had to be accessed through newspaper archives. Because there is a charge for 
each article accessed, the source of articles was limited to The Washington Post. I ran an 
advanced search on the archive’s search engine for the most relevant articles under the keyword 
“Daniel Ellsberg” between June 1971 and June 1972. I used the first eight articles pulled by the 
search.  
 The articles pertaining to Snowden’s released of the classified NSA documents were 
more readily available for no charge. For consistency, I pulled articles from The Washington 
Post for comparison. I also included articles from Politco.com and The New Yorker. 
Portrayals of Daniel Ellsberg 
 Eight articles were used to explore the media’s portrayal of Daniel Ellsberg after the 
publication of the Pentagon Papers, which he released to The New York Times in 1971. These 
articles were gathered from The Washington Post’s online archive through an advanced search. 
The following themes were determined through thematic analysis: Ellsberg was a reliable source 
and the newspaper was measured and unbiased in its reporting. Only one of the eight articles 
presented Ellsberg in a negative light. That article, “A Tet Memo from Ellsberg” repeatedly 
referred to Ellsberg as “mistaken,” “wrong,” and “flawed” in his interpretation of U.S. 
involvement in southeast Asia. 
 Ellsberg was a reliable source. What was overwhelmingly apparent in the articles 
published during the height of the Pentagon Papers scandal was the amount of respect afforded 
to Ellsberg. He was regarded as a thoughtful man, unafraid to admit when mistakes were made 
(Wills, 1971). In one article, multiple positive references were made to Ellsberg’s education, 
qualifications, and history of government service; he was called the “MIT scholar,” “the MIT 
professor,” “the former defense analyst,” and “the former Pentagon planner,” (Greider, 1971). 
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Ellsberg held press conferences on his own, which the media attended and documented in the 
press. His statements were presented in the same tone as those of government officials. 
 Measured coverage by the media. Also overwhelmingly apparent was the matter-of-
fact nature of reporting by The Washington Post during the Pentagon Papers era. Of the eight 
articles examined, seven were noted as straightforward and unbiased in their reportage. 
Ellsberg’s perspective was offered, as was that of the government in prosecuting him, in equal 
measure. 
Portrayals of Edward Snowden 
 Eight articles were used to explore the media’s portrayal of Edward Snowden in the year 
following the June 2013 publication of classified NSA documents he collected and released to 
reporters from The Guardian and The Washington Post. These articles were originally posted in 
The Washington Post and The New Yorker and on Politico.com. The following themes were 
determined through thematic analysis: the revelations are insignificant; Snowden is an 
egomaniac; and the sources are faulty. Only one article made mention of a positive effect of the 
disclosures, noting they “shed useful light on some NSA programs and raised questions that 
deserve debate” (Editorial Board, 2013, para. 3).  
 The revelations are insignificant. The first theme to be determined during thematic 
analysis pertained to the idea that what Snowden revealed was not so surprising after all. In two 
of the articles examined, the writers went so far as to claim it is naïve of anyone to assume the 
government does not monitor, in some way, our electronic communications. In an opinion piece 
for The Washington Post, Richard Cohen (2013) claimed the government is merely doing what 
Internet companies like Google do daily while facing very little outrage. He opened the piece in 
a most flippant way:  
22 
 
An old journalism saw goes like this: Dog bites man, no story. Man bites dog, story. 
Allow me to update it. Government monitors e-mail and telephone calls for national 
security, no story. Government doesn’t do anything of the kind—now, that’s a story. 
(para. 1) 
 
Cohen calls Snowden “the self-proclaimed martyr for our civil liberties” and Greenwald the 
“vainglorious” reporter for The Guardian (para. 3). Cohen claimed “no one lied about the 
various programs disclosed [by Snowden]. They were secret, yes, but members of Congress were 
informed—and they approved” (para 5). Cohen also continued the Google analogy by stating:  
When I see “Hello, Richard” on my computer screen, I realize what’s happened: It 
knows me. It knows what I bought and when I bought it and where I was at the time. 
It knows my sizes and my credit card number, and if it knows all that, it knows pretty 
much everything. I long ago sacrificed a measure of privacy for convenience. One 
click will do it. 
I also made the same sort of deal for security. I assumed the government was doing at 
least was Google was doing. (para. 6-7) 
 
To Cohen, the idea of the NSA monitoring anyone’s communication is no surprise at all. 
 In a piece for The New Yorker, Jeffrey Toobin (2013) argued “Edward Snowden is no 
hero.” He questioned how naïve Snowden must have been to be shocked by the NSA’s practices.  
He describes himself as appalled by the government he served…what, one wonders, 
did Snowden think the NSA did? Any marginally attentive citizen, much less NSA 
employee or contractor, knows that the entire mission of the agency is to intercept 
electronic communications. Perhaps he thought that the NSA operated only outside of 
the United States; in that case, he hadn’t been paying very close attention. (para. 2) 
 
Later in the article, Toobin claimed “these were legally authorized programs…[H]e wasn’t 
blowing the whistle on anything illegal; he was exposing something that failed to meet his own 
standards of propriety” (para. 3). Toobin, like Cohen, found nothing surprising in Snowden’s 
leaked documents.  
 Snowden is an egomaniac. The second prevalent theme to be determined through 
thematic analysis was the perception that Snowden was a narcissist looking for infamy and status 
as a hero. A number of the articles interpreted Snowden’s statements as over-the-top and overly 
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sensational. Even Barton Gellman (2013), with whom Snowden initially worked, wrote Snowden 
“was capable of melodrama” (para. 16). In his opinion piece for The Washington Post, Cohen 
(2013) wrote that “everything about Edward Snowden is ridiculously cinematic. He is not 
patriotic; he is merely narcissistic” (para. 8). The Washington Post editorial board referred to him 
as a “naïve hacker” (para. 4), while Toobin (2013) called him “a grandiose narcissist who 
deserves to be in prison” (para. 1).  
 In a particularly blistering article for Politico.com, Roger Simon (2013) decried Snowden 
as a “slacker” with “hardly any qualifications” (para. 8) who stumbled into his position at the 
NSA. Simon pointed out that Snowden dropped out of high school and failed to complete his 
basic military training, referring to him as a “dud” and “loser” (para. 1-2). Simon ruthlessly 
attacked what he perceived was Snowden’s lack of intelligence and judgment: 
Snowden flees the United States to a luxury hotel in—wait for it—China.  
True it is Hong Kong, a fabulous city brimming with soaring skyscrapers, marvelous 
restaurants, a glamorous nightlife and people of copious wealth. And true, Hong 
Kong operates as a ‘semi-autonomous region’ of China in which people have more 
rights.  
But as James Fallows of The Atlantic recently wrote: ‘Hong Kong is not a sovereign 
country. Is it part of China—a country that by the libertarian standards Edward 
Snowden says he cares about it is worse, not better, than the United States. It has even 
more surveillance of its citizens….Its press is thoroughly government controlled; it 
has no legal theory of protection for free speech; and it doesn’t even have national 
elections.’ 
Oh well, small slip-up….But Snowden never claimed to be a genius. Maybe the 
history of modern China was not on his GED exam. (para. 15-21) 
 
Many reporters found a lot to attack in the man who revealed the NSA’s secrets. 
 The sources are faulty. Finally, thematic analysis revealed a proclivity toward covering 
the publication of the information rather than the content of the information. In a piece for The 
Washington Post, Paul Fehrl (2013) disparaged The Guardian as “small and underweight, even 
by British standards” (para. 1), calling it “a financially struggling, frankly liberal newspaper” 
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(para. 5). Ferhl’s article posed the following question: “Why is a London-based news 
organization revealing so many secrets about the American government” (para. 7). Almost no 
specifics were offered in the article of the “many secrets” that organization exposed. Similarly, 
most of the space in every article was devoted to discussing Snowden himself rather than what 
Snowden revealed. 
Findings 
 Based upon the 16 articles reviewed for this study, it can be noted the media’s portrayal 
of Daniel Ellsberg in the 1970s was far more measured and far less heated than the contemporary 
media’s portrayal of Edward Snowden. While Ellsberg was respected as a source of information, 
Snowden was widely panned as an unreliable egotist. During Ellsberg’s scandal, the focus of the 
story was primarily on the value of what he revealed, while the focus of Snowden’s scandal has 
been the whistleblower himself. Pickard (2013) claimed Snowden’s treatment was calculated: 
“What seems like an obvious effort by the media to discredit Snowden could be viewed as a 
deliberate attempt by the media to divert attention from the substance of the disclosures to the 
source of the disclosures” (para. 16).  
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I presented the findings of my research into the media’s portrayals of 
Daniel Ellsberg and Edward Snowden during their respective whistleblowing scandals. I 
determined there was a clear and marked difference in how each man was portrayed, with 
Ellsberg largely finding respect in the media and Snowden facing harsh and personal criticism. 
These results were garnered through thematic analysis of newspaper articles published in the 
year following each scandal. 
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 The next chapter will offer a conclusion to this study and offer suggestions for further 
research into this fruitful topic. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 This study intended to determine what similarities and differences existed in the media’s 
portrayals of the respective scandals of Daniel Ellsberg and Edward Snowden. Through thematic 
analysis, I determined there was a marked difference in how each of the men was portrayed by 
the press. While Ellsberg was widely respected and considered a reliable source of information, 
Snowden was vilified and attacked.  
 This is particularly interesting, as Ellsberg is now heralded as a patriot and hero for 
handing the Pentagon Papers over to The New York Times. The question is: will Snowden one 
day be proclaimed a hero, as well? 
 It is important to consider the kinds of information each man shared and the cultural 
climate of the time. This could reasonably influence the reception of certain revelations and of 
the revelators themselves. In Ellsberg’s case, the Pentagon Papers revealed the sordid truth 
behind an already reviled war that had left many American soldiers dead or scarred by the 
battlefield. His actions contributed in large part to the end of the Vietnam War, preventing an 
unpredictable number of additional deaths. It was likely very easy for the American public to 
view his actions as heroic. 
 Snowden’s disclosures were made in a post-September 11 world—a world that seemed 
possible of falling prey to terrorists at any moment. This kind of world was quite unknown to the 
United States, which had seen decades of nearly uninterrupted peace on its soil. In such a 
frightening world, many Americans felt comfortable sacrificing a certain amount of personal 
liberty in exchange for safety and security. Any threat to that security, real or perceived, could 
easily have been viewed as not only unpatriotic but a downright betrayal. It would be 
understandably difficult for Snowden or Snowden’s supporters to break through such a fear-
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based mindset and make the argument that his revelations were for the good of the American 
public. 
 We must also keep in mind how much the media changed between 1971 and 2013. If 
digital media existed in Ellsberg’s day, what kind of reception would he have received? If 
reactionary pundits had an equal platform (i.e., the Internet) to post their extreme views, whether 
for or against his actions, how would that have influenced mainstream coverage of his scandal? 
If news organizations operated on a 24-hour news cycle, how would that have changed what I 
determined was the measured and unbiased the Pentagon Papers received in The Washington 
Post? Had journalists and bloggers dragged the minutia of Ellsberg’s life through their respective 
media platforms, would the outcome of his story have changed? As much as anyone, myself 
included, wishes to compare Ellsberg and Snowden as equals, it may simply be impossible. 
Only time will tell if Snowden will someday enjoy the same public exoneration as 
Ellsberg, but from my research I would venture to assume the path to glory will not come easily 
to Snowden. Ellsberg (2013, 2014) has gone on record stating he sees no difference in what he 
did and what Snowden did, but the wild beast of the collective digital, print, and broadcast media 
seems less convinced 
Recommendations for Further Research 
Research in this study was limited to the media’s portrayals of two whistleblowers in the 
years following their scandals. It did not attempt to determine how the public’s perception of 
those whistleblowers was affected by these portrayals. Further research could be done in this 
area. In a democracy, the public determines who has power. If whistleblowing (like that of 
Ellsberg, Snowden, and others) affects the public view of those with authority and inspires the 
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citizenry to question those in office, this could have great implication for the American political 
scene. 
Further research could also be done to determine how reporting styles have changed in 
the 40 years between the scandals and how those changes affect coverage of political scandals. 
This could go far beyond examples of whistleblowing. Such research could affect how news 
organizations approach political stories.  
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